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This paper estimates the effect of trade liberalization on growth, using plant-level data from 
Switzerland. We employ a natural experiment framework to quantify the effect of a bundle 
of treaties liberalizing trade between Switzerland and the EU enacted in June 2002 ("Bilateral 
Agreements I") on the growth of Swiss plants. Using both a semi-parametric difference-in-
differences and a matching approach, we find that the liberalization of trade increased the 
growth of affected plants by 1-2 percent during the first six years after liberalization. Our 
results suggest that trade liberalization has a relevant effect on growth. 
Keywords 
Trade liberalization, growth, plant size, policy evaluation 
JEL Classification 
C31, F13, F43, L25, O47, O52 1 Introduction
What is the eect of trade liberalization on economic growth? Great eort has been
devoted to answering this question, yet there is arguably little persuasive empirical evi-
dence. The key diculty in providing persuasive evidence is to identify the direction of
causation between trade and growth (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Irwin and Tervi o, 2002).
Other major diculties include the measurement of a country's openness to trade, and
the plausible isolation of the eects of trade liberalization from other events (Edwards,
1993; Rodr guez and Rodrik, 2000; Yanikkaya, 2003; Wacziarg and Welch, 2008). In view
of these diculties, Winters (2004, F4) nds that the most plausible conclusion from a
survey of the literature is that trade liberalization \generally induces a temporary (but
possibly long-lived) increase in growth". In another survey, L opez (2005, 623) oers a
more gloomy view of the literature, stating that \neither the existing theoretical models
nor previous empirical analyses seem to have produced a denitive and positive answer
to this area of inquiry."
In this paper, we propose a policy evaluation approach towards estimating the eect of
trade liberalization on growth.1 This approach is designed to quantify the causal eect of
an exogenous policy change on the relevant outcome variables of a population of subjects
in a natural experiment (Meyer, 1995) framework, thereby circumventing the diculties
mentioned above. Specically, we view the enactment of a bundle of treaties between
Switzerland and the European Union in June 2002|the \Bilateral Agreements I"2|as a
plausibly exogenous instance of trade liberalization and estimate its impact on the growth
of business plants in Switzerland, using micro data on the universe of Swiss plants from
1995 to 2008.
To implement this approach, we carefully study the contents of the seven treaties and
employ the Swiss equivalent of the Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) code at the
two-digit level to assign individual plants to the groups of `non-aected', `aected', and
`strongly aected' plants, respectively. Based on this classication, we use a Dierence-in-
Dierences (DiD) approach3 to estimate the eect of the Bilateral Agreements I on plant
growth in Switzerland. The idea is that, if the non-aected and the aected plants were
subject to the same time trends (i.e., similar plant growth) and if trade liberalization
had no eect in the pre-liberalization period, we can use the mean change in the size
1See Angrist and Pischke (2008), Blundell and Costa Dias (2009), and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)
for recent surveys of the policy evaluation literature.
2The Bilateral Agreements I prescribe a signicant reciprocal market opening in seven areas: technical
trade barriers, free movement of persons, agricultural products, public procurement, ground transporta-
tion, civil aviation, and scientic and technological cooperation. We provide further details on these
agreements in Section 2 below.
3See Lechner (2010) for a recent survey on the estimation of causal eects by DiD methods.
1of the non-aected plants and add it to the mean size of the aected plants prior to
the liberalization to construct the mean counterfactual size the aected plants would
have reached if they had not been subject to trade liberalization. Of course, we control
for exogenous variables that would have led to dierential time trends in the absence
of trade liberalization.4 To ensure a high robustness of our results against potential
misspecication of the relation between outcome and control variables, we do this in a
semi-parametric way based on the propensity score.
We also adopt a matching approach (Rubin, 1978) to check the robustness of our result
to a slight, but potentially important, variation of the identifying assumptions.5 The
key dierence between the matching and the DiD methodology concerns the role of the
pre-liberalization outcomes for constructing the non-observable counterfactual outcome.
With matching, these outcomes are used together with exogenous variables to nd plants
not subject to trade liberalization which are similar to plants subject to liberalization.
They are then used to estimate the counterfactual outcomes. With DiD, in turn, plants
are made identical with respect to the exogenous variables only, and the pre-liberalization
outcomes are directly subtracted from the post-liberalization outcomes to estimate the
missing counterfactual trends.6
The estimation results of the DiD approach are similar to those of the matching
approach, even though the latter are somewhat less precise. Our results suggest that the
liberalization of trade increased the growth of the aected plants by 1-2 percent during
the rst six years after liberalization. The extra growth of the strongly aected plants
during the same time is estimated to be higher (up to around 4-5 percent). In addition,
the estimates indicate that, just prior to their enactment, the Bilateral Agreements I
transitionally reduced the average growth of the aected plants by up to 2 percent.
The latter result is consistent with the notion that plants improve their productivity in
anticipation of a market opening (cf. L opez (2005)).7
It is instructive to compare our microeconometric estimates with the macroeconomic
evidence recently reported by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). Building on Rodr guez and
Rodrik (2000), these authors provide an updated version of the classic cross-country study
by Sachs and Warner (1995). Using data from 1950 to 1998, they nd that countries which
liberalized their trade regimes experienced average annual growth rates that were about
1.5 percentage points higher than before liberalization. In a related cross-country study,
4We will detail our econometric approach in Section 4.
5See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a recent survey on matching methods.
6That is, once pre-liberalization outcomes are used as conditioning variables in DiD, matching and
DiD are identical.
7The result needs to be interpreted carefully, though, since we cannot directly observe plant produc-
tivity and must assume that plant output was not reduced.
2Mattoo et al. (2006) nd that countries with fully open telecom and nancial services
sectors grow up to 1.5 percentage points faster than other countries. These results are
fairly similar to our ndings both in terms of the sign and the size of the estimated eect,
even though the authors use very dierent data and econometric techniques.8
This paper contributes to three related strands of the literature. First, by exploiting
a plausibly exogenous variation in trade policy and using micro data on the universe of
an economy's plants to provide an estimate of the causal eect of trade liberalization on
growth at the plant level, we introduce the policy evaluation approach into the literature
on the eect of trade liberalization on growth surveyed by Rodr guez and Rodrik (2000),
Winters (2004), and L opez (2005). To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst micro-
econometric study of the eect of trade liberalization on growth. Our approach exploits
the heterogeneity available in a large population of business plants and is well-suited
to circumvent many of the diculties plaguing previous empirical contributions to this
strand of the literature. In contrast to previous work, which often focused on developing
countries, this paper considers a small open economy in the middle of Europe with a
well-developed service sector. In doing so, our analysis sheds new light on the subtle
relation between trade policy and economic growth.
Second, our analysis provides further evidence on the new trade theory pioneered by
Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003).9 Assuming that rm productivity is xed, the
new trade theory predicts that trade liberalization leads to the exit of the least productive
rms and the reallocation of market shares towards more productive rms. That is,
according to the new trade theory, trade liberalization should have a negative (positive)
eect on the growth of the least (most) productive rms, whereas the average eect on
the aected rms is generally ambiguous. Our nding of a signicant and positive growth
eect on the aected plants is consistent with the predictions of the new trade theory.
Note, however, that we cannot directly test these predictions with our data, since we do
not observe productivity.
Third, our analysis adds to related work by Pavcnik (2002), Tre
er (2004), Ederington
and McCalman (2008), and Bustos (2011). These papers emphasize that trade liberal-
ization not only generates a reallocation of market shares towards more productive rms,
but also increases the productivity within rms. In particular, trade liberalization may
induce rms to purposefully increase their productivity in anticipation of trade liberaliza-
8L opez (2005, 628) provides a list of other well-cited cross-country studies which nd a positive
and statistically signicant correlation between some measure of openness to trade and economic (or
productivity) growth.
9More recent work includes Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Baldwin and Forslid (2010), Redding (2010),
Bernard et al. (2010), and Eaton et al. (forthcoming). Panagariya (2000) provides a useful survey of the
theory of preferential trade liberalization.
3tion (L opez, 2005), or to use the resulting revenue increase for technology upgrading after
trade liberalization (Bustos, 2011). Our estimates are consistent with such productivity
increases both before and after the opening of the Swiss economy towards the European
markets.
We believe that the evaluation of changes in macroeconomic (e.g., trade) policy at the
microeconomic (e.g., plant) level oers a promising avenue for future research. In particu-
lar, the increasing availability of comprehensive plant-level data sets provides interesting
new opportunities for analyzing the impact of major policy changes on relevant outcome
variables at the micro level (e.g., plant size, plant productivity, etc.). Regarding the
impact of trade liberalization on growth, it would be interesting to compare the results
of our analysis to similar microeconometric studies of other instances of trade liberaliza-
tion.10 A collection of such studies is likely to provide persuasive empirical evidence on
the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a survey
of Switzerland's trade policy towards the European Union, and discusses the contents
of the treaties forming the Bilateral Agreements I. Section 3 describes the data base,
explains the classication of individual plants into groups of non-aected, aected, and
strongly aected plants, and provides a rst descriptive analysis. Section 4 discusses the
empirical research design, the plausibility of the required identifying assumptions, and
our estimation approach. Section 5 provides the results from estimating the causal eect
of trade liberalization on plant growth. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix provides
detailed information on the construction of our sample, the complete classication of
plants, and further supporting material.
2 Swiss Trade Policy towards the European Union
Switzerland is a small open economy located in the middle of Europe. The country
is a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA),11 but belongs neither
to the European Economic Area (EEA) nor to the European Union (EU).12 Instead,
Switzerland's relations to the EU are governed by a set of bilateral agreements surveyed
below.
10A related study by Revenga (1997) on the impact of trade liberalization on Mexican manufacturing
employs dierent econometric techniques and does not consider the impact on growth.
11At the time of writing, the other EFTA members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.
12The national currency is the Swiss Franc (CHF).
42.1 Survey of Bilateral Agreements
Over the last decades, the following agreements between Switzerland and the EU (or the
European Community, respectively) were concluded (see Integration Oce, 2009):13
(1) Free Trade Agreement of 1972: This agreement forms the basis of the close economic
relations between Switzerland and the EU.14 It prohibits taris and quotas on
industrial products (e.g. watches and machines) between Switzerland and the EU,
but falls short of a customs union.
(2) Insurance Agreement of 1989: This agreement guarantees insurance companies the
mutual right to establish operations in the territories of the contracting parties.
(3) Bilateral Agreements I: This is a bundle of agreements which goes well beyond the
Free Trade Agreement of 1972 and prescribes further market opening in seven areas:
technical trade barriers, free movement of persons, agricultural products, public
procurement, ground transportation, civil aviation, and scientic and technological
cooperation.15 The Bilateral Agreements I were approved by the Swiss electorate
in May 2000 (approval rate: 67%) and are eective since June 1, 2002.
(4) Bilateral Agreements II: This bundle of agreements concerns further interests. In
particular, it extends cooperation to the elds of internal security, asylum, the
environment, and culture. These agreements were jointly approved in June 2005
(approval rate: 55%), but the time of enactment varies considerably across the
individual agreements.
In our empirical analysis below, we will focus on the Bilateral Agreements I. These
agreements are designed to liberalize (and safeguard) free trade between Switzerland and
the EU. The `Bilateral Agreements II', in turn, extend the mutual cooperation to asylum,
security, and environmental policy and have little (if any) relevance for international
trade. Our focus on the Bilateral Agreements I is further warranted by the fact that they
have a single and well-dened date of enactment (June 1, 2002) which happens to be in
the middle of our panel data set on the universe of Swiss plants ranging from 1995 to
2008.16
13Updated information is available at: www.europa.admin.ch/themen/00500/index.html?lang=en.
14The EU is Switzerland's most important trade partner. In 2008, bilateral trade per day passed 1
billion CHF. Roughly every third CHF was earned through trade with the EU, and roughly 80% of Swiss
exports went to the EU. Conversely, Switzerland was the third-largest trading partner of the EU behind
the U.S. and Russia, but ahead of China (Integration Oce, 2009, 4).
15See Section 2.2 for further details.
16We will provide a more detailed description of our data in Section 3.
52.2 The Bilateral Agreements I
The Bilateral Agreements I implemented a mutual opening of Swiss and EU markets in
seven areas. We brie
y discuss the respective contractual agreements, based on informa-
tion provided by the Integration Oce (2009).
(A) Technical trade barriers. The so-called \Mutual Recognition Agreement" (MRA)
stipulates the mutual recognition of conformity tests for most industrial products.
Conformity tests certify that a product complies with the relevant regulations and
may be oered on the market. The agreement covers diverse groups of industrial
products, including machines, printers, medical products, motor vehicles, tractors,
measuring instruments, telecommunications devices and (since March 2008) build-
ing materials (Integration Oce, 2009, 14). The mutual recognition of conformity
tests simplies bilateral trade between Switzerland and the EU considerably. It im-
plies, in particular, that any product approved in either Switzerland or the EU can
be introduced in both markets, eliminating the need for double conformity testing.
(B) Free movements of persons. The agreement ensures equal treatment of Swiss and
EU citizens in taking up residence and work. In particular, it improves the gradual
mutual opening of labor markets, stipulates the recognition of professional diplomas,
and coordinates the dierent social security systems.
(C) Agricultural products. The agreement liberalizes the cheese market (free trade since
June 2007) and simplies trade in other agricultural products by reducing customs
duties and eliminating non-tari barriers to trade.
(D) Public procurement. The agreement extends WTO rules and subjects larger tenders
by municipalities and licensed rms (e.g., telecommunications and railway opera-
tors) to compulsory tendering.
(E) Ground transportation. The agreement increases the maximum weight limit for
heavy trucks from 28 to 40 tonnes and prescribes the introduction of a Pigouvian
tax on heavy vehicles, which provides incentives for moving transalpine freight from
road to rail.
(F) Civil aviation. The agreement stipulates reciprocal access to aviation markets (in-
cluding landing rights).
(G) Scientic and technological cooperation. The agreement improves the participation
of Swiss research institutions and individuals in EU research programs.
63 Data
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical analysis will exploit the cross-sectional
variation in the extent to which plants were aected by the liberalization. Our panel data
set allows us to combine this variation with the longitudinal variation from the fact that
even the (strongly) aected plants were unaected by the liberalization years before the
market opening. In this section, we begin with describing the data base and classifying
the plants into groups of non-aected, aected, and strongly aected plants, respectively.
Next, we characterize the sample actually used and provide some descriptive statistics
for the various groups of plants.
3.1 Data Base
Our analysis is based on ve waves (1995, 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2008) of the Swiss Business
Census, which is a complete inventory count of all business establishments with more than
20 weekly aggregate working hours (excluding the agricultural sector). The Business
Census is compiled by the Federal Statistical Oce, and participation is mandatory.
The Business Census provides detailed plant-level information on individual rms. In
particular, it covers the number of employees (as well as their gender, nationality, etc.),
the geographic location, and the industry classication, using the Swiss equivalent to the
SIC code. Our database is unique in sample size, coverage of economic sectors and length
of the observation period. In particular, it includes the service sector (e.g., wholesale and
retail trade, banking, etc.), which is of crucial importance for the Swiss economy.
There are a two drawbacks of our data as well. First, we lack information about
the productivity of individual plants or rms. Second, we cannot observe the outputs
(or prices) of individual plants and therefore use the level of employment in full-time
equivalents (FTEs) as a proxy for plant size. Nevertheless, if we accept the level of
employment in FTEs as a reasonable measure of plant size, the database is well-suited
to examine the eect of trade liberalization on plant growth.
3.2 Classication of Plants
We classify individual plants as non-aected, aected, or strongly aected, respectively,
by the Bilateral Agreements I, based on an assessment of the extent to which a plant's
(two-digit level) industry was aected by the seven agreements (A)-(G) discussed in
Section 2.2.17 Let us illustrate this assessment, using industry 33 (\Medical Apparatus,
Precision Instruments") as an example. For each individual agreement, we studied the
17We acknowledge that this assessment involves some judgement on our part.
7ocial documentation and determined whether it aected industry 33. We found that this
industry was aected by agreements (A), (B) and (D), but not by the other agreements.
In light of our nding that industry 33 was aected by three out of seven agreements,
we classied it as strongly aected and assigned it to group \2".18 Industries aected
by less than three agreements, in turn, were typically classied as aected (group \1")
or \non-aected" (group \0"), respectively. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides the
complete classication of all industries and further details on our assessment of individual
industries.
Table 1 summarizes our classication of plants by industry. It shows each industry's
classication into one of the three groups as well as the number of plants in that industry.
Several comments are in order. First, the group of strongly aected plants is dominated
by manufacturing industries 29 (\Machinery, Equipment") and 33 (\Medical Appara-
tus, Precision Instruments"). They jointly account for roughly 70% of the 8,602 plants.
Agreement (A) lists these industries among those which particularly benet from the
elimination of technical trade barriers. Second, in the group of aected rms, the service
industries 50 (\Trade Vehicle") and 51 (\Wholesale and Commission Trade") account for
almost 65% of the 44,662 plants. These industries are aected, for instance, by the \pack-
ing conformity" stipulated by agreement (A). Third, a considerable number of industries,
in particular in the service sector (e.g., 52 \Retail Trade", 55 \Lodging and Restaurants",
etc.) is not aected by the Bilateral Agreements I. The 187,672 non-aected plants in
these industries form the control group.19
3.3 Sample
Since we are interested in estimating the impact of trade liberalization on the growth
of prot-oriented plants, we deleted cooperatives (\Genossenschaften"), associations and
clubs (\Vereine"), foundations (\Stiftungen"), as well as churches, embassies and interna-
tional organizations from our sample. In addition, we dropped industries with a negligible
number of plants (e.g., mining) and non-prot oriented industries dominated by public
administration (e.g, education, and health care and welfare). Finally, since our identica-
tion strategy requires pre-liberalization outcomes and covariates, we restricted the sample
to rms which were active both in 1995 and 1998. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows how
deleting these groups of plants aects the sample size. To avoid any selection bias due
to liberalization-induced exit, we kept non-surviving plants after 1998 in the sample, but
18None of the industries was aected by more than three agreements.
19Potentially, all industries might have been aected by agreement (B). However, the in
ow of workers
from EU countries was, and continues to be, severely limited by quotas (see Section 4.2).
8Table 1: Classication of Plants by Industry
Group Classication Percentage within
Industry \0" \1" \2" Group Total
Manufacturing
15 Food and Luxury Food 0 2,678 0 6.00 1.11
16 Tobacco Products 0 19 0 0.04 0.01
17 Textiles 0 802 0 1.80 0.33
18 Apparel 0 851 0 1.91 0.35
19 Leather Products 0 300 0 0.67 0.12
20 Wood, Cork, etc. 0 5,909 0 13.23 2.45
21 Paper 0 240 0 0.54 0.10
22 Publishing, Printing 3,872 0 0 2.06 1.61
23 Koke, Rened Petroleum 21 0 0 0.01 0.01
24 Chemicals 0 764 0 1.71 0.32
25 Syntheticals 0 750 0 1.68 0.31
26 Glass, Ceramic 1,291 0 0 0.69 0.54
27 Production of Metal 299 0 0 0.16 0.12
28 Metal Products 6,550 0 0 3.49 2.72
29 Machinery, Equipment 0 0 3,428 39.85 1.42
30 Business Machines 0 0 133 1.55 0.06
31 Electric Machinery 0 0 1,123 13.06 0.47
32 Radio, TV, Communication 0 0 582 6.77 0.24
33 Med. Appar., Precision Instr. 0 0 2,803 32.59 1.16
34 Automobiles and Parts of Cars 0 0 208 2.42 0.09
35 Other Vehicles 0 0 325 3.78 0.13
36 Furniture, Jewelry, etc. 0 3,476 0 7.78 1.44
37 Recycling 255 0 0 0.14 0.11
All Manufacturing Industries 12,288 15,789 8,602 15.22
Services
40 Energy Supply 336 0 0 0.18 0.14
41 Water Supply 26 0 0 0.01 0.01
45 Construction 28,486 0 0 15.18 11.82
50 Trade Vehicles (also Parts) 0 12,659 0 28.34 5.25
51 Wholesale and Commission Trade 0 16,214 0 36.30 6.73
52 Retail Trade 44,136 0 0 23.52 18.32
55 Lodging and Restaurants 23,317 0 0 12.42 9.68
60 Land Transportation, Pipelines 6,090 0 0 3.25 2.53
61 Water Transportation 108 0 0 0.06 0.04
62 Air Transportation 221 0 0 0.12 0.09
63 Auxiliary Transport Activities 2,971 0 0 1.58 1.23
64 Post and Telecommunications 260 0 0 0.14 0.11
65 Banks, Funds 2,916 0 0 1.55 1.21
66 Insurance Companies 1,618 0 0 0.86 0.67
67 Banking Business Activities 1,490 0 0 0.79 0.62
70 Real Estate and Housing 2,469 0 0 1.32 1.02
71 Renting of Goods and Chattels 665 0 0 0.35 0.28
72 Data Processing and Data Bases 4,232 0 0 2.25 1.76
73 Research and Development 241 0 0 0.13 0.10
74 Other Business Activity 39,288 0 0 20.93 16.31
90 Sewage and Waste Treatment 325 0 0 0.17 0.13
91 Sp. Intr. Groups, Relig. Org. 424 0 0 0.23 0.18
92 Culture and Sports Activities 3865 0 0 2.06 1.60
93 Other Services 11,900 0 0 6.34 4.94
All Services Industries 175,384 28,873 0 84.78
All Industries 187,672 44,662 8,602 100.00
Notes: Shown is the number of plants by industry in 1995, classied into non-aected (\0"),
aected (\1"), and strongly aected (\2") plants, as well as their shares in the respective
group and the full sample. The total number of plants is 240,936 with 36,679 units in the
manufacturing and 204,257 units in the service sector.
9set their employment levels to zero.20 Table A.3 in the Appendix provides more detailed
information on the number of plants and plant exit. It shows, not surprisingly, that the
probability of closure is considerably higher for smaller plants than for larger plants. This
nding holds for all three groups.
3.4 Descriptive Statistics
A relevant question for our analysis is whether the rms in the dierent groups are similar
with respect to their characteristics. Next, we therefore provide descriptive statistics for
the pre- and post-liberalization plant characteristics by group and year, respectively.
Inspection of Table 2 indicates that, pre-liberalization, the three-year growth rates
of plant employment (from 1995 to 1998, and from 1998 to 2001, respectively) were
around ten percent for all groups.21 The average number of employees per plant, in turn,
varied considerably across groups. The average size of non-aected plants (around seven
FTEs) was slightly smaller than that of aected plants (around ten FTEs), and much
smaller than that of strongly aected plants (above 25 FTEs) in all years. The share of
manufacturing rms was highest in the group of strongly aected rms (more than 75
percent). This is as expected because the Bilateral Agreements I were meant to facilitate
trade in industrial products. Similarly, for 1995, we nd that the share of exporting and
importing plants was highest in the group of strongly aected rms (around 45 and 52
percent, respectively).22 The pattern is less clear for the other pre-liberalization plant
characteristics.
Table 3 shows that, after liberalization, the growth rates were around seven percent
from 2001 to 2005, and around eight to eleven percent from 2005 to 2008. That is, except
for the group of strongly aected plants, growth rates were consistently lower than in the
pre-liberalization period. The average number of employees per plant, in turn, increased
slightly. Specically, the average size of non-aected plants increased from around seven
FTEs in the pre-treatment period to around eight (2005) and nine (2008) FTEs in the
post-treatment period, whereas the size of aected plants increased from around ten FTEs
to around twelve (2005) and thirteen (2008) FTEs.23 The share of the manufacturing
plants in the group of strongly aected plants stayed roughly constant above 75 percent.
Also, the share of exporting and importing plants continued to be highest in the group of
strongly aected rms (around 46 and 54 percent, respectively). Again, there is no clear
20This is feasible because the only post-1998 information needed for the estimation is based on em-
ployment levels which are well dened even if a plant is closed.
21Note that the 1995-1998 comparison covers only rms with positive employment in both years.
22This information is available only for 1995 and 2005.
23The increase in plant size is partly due to exit, since smaller plants are more likely to exit than larger
plants (see Table A.3 in the Appendix for further details).
10Table 2: Pre-Liberalization Plant Characteristics by Year and Group
1995 1998 2001
Variables \0" \1" \2" \0" \1" \2" \0" \1" \2"
No. of Employees 7.09 9.94 26.20 6.87 9.62 25.23 7.65 10.87 28.61
Manufacturers 6.55 35.35 100.00 7.35 32.70 80.47 7.95 33.24 77.90
Foreign Assets 3.37 3.87 8.16 n/a n/a n/a 2.14 4.20 9.25
Foreign Owned 2.44 5.72 5.48 n/a n/a n/a 1.68 4.53 5.36
Exporters 11.15 22.75 45.77 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Importers 20.00 42.77 52.26 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Renewal Region 27.20 28.05 32.32 27.20 28.13 32.39 27.36 28.08 32.57
Municipality
Center 39.82 28.93 31.62 39.46 28.51 31.14 38.96 27.40 29.82
Suburban 24.12 30.22 31.78 24.29 30.49 32.07 24.44 30.98 33.11
High-Income 3.53 3.53 2.70 3.57 3.55 2.71 3.56 3.60 2.61
Periurban 7.20 8.72 8.75 7.28 8.82 8.81 7.34 8.97 9.00
Touristic 5.47 2.93 1.26 5.48 2.93 1.28 5.62 2.98 1.30
Ind. Tertiary 9.78 10.51 11.89 9.79 10.58 11.94 9.89 10.69 12.12
Rural Commuter 4.37 6.28 5.84 4.38 6.24 5.92 4.36 6.41 5.74
Rural Mixed 4.89 7.58 5.63 4.92 7.61 5.55 4.99 7.69 5.70
Rural 0.82 1.30 0.53 0.83 1.27 0.58 0.85 1.29 0.60
Region
Geneva Lake 19.00 16.71 12.86 18.99 16.71 12.90 18.85 16.37 12.46
Espace Midland 21.43 21.77 27.26 21.42 21.76 27.17 21.48 21.70 27.42
North-West 12.43 12.13 13.24 12.42 12.13 13.35 12.34 12.47 13.29
Z urich 18.05 18.40 18.40 18.00 18.29 18.40 17.93 18.02 18.27
East 14.69 15.21 15.66 14.71 15.23 15.65 14.79 15.58 15.93
Central 9.09 10.61 8.85 9.13 10.72 8.81 9.31 10.90 8.90
Tessin 5.31 5.17 3.73 5.31 5.17 3.72 5.30 4.97 3.72
1995 to 1998 1998 to 2001
\0" \1" \2" \0" \1" \2"
Growth Rates 10.66 10.93 10.52 10.88 9.26 11.16
Notes: Shown are the numbers of employees (in FTEs), the percentage shares, and the growth
rates by year and group. \0", \1" and \2" label the groups of non-aected, aected, and strongly
aected plants, respectively. The denitions of the variables are provided in Table A.4 in the
Appendix.
11pattern for the other plant characteristics.
Table 3: Post-Liberalization Plant Characteristics by Year and Group
2005 2008
Variables \0" \1" \2" \0" \1" \2"
Number of Employees 8.19 11.85 29.47 9.06 13.18 35.15
Manufacturers 7.97 32.71 78.33 8.15 32.24 77.45
Foreign Assets 1.96 3.88 8.91 n/a n/a n/a
Foreign Owned 2.13 5.54 6.60 n/a n/a n/a
Exporters 10.26 21.63 46.57 n/a n/a n/a
Importers 17.15 40.95 54.61 n/a n/a n/a
Renewal Region 27.51 28.45 32.86 27.81 28.93 33.08
2001 to 2005 2005 to 2008
\0" \1" \2" \0" \1" \2"
Growth Rates 6.64 6.76 6.61 9.40 8.00 11.12
Notes: Shown are the numbers of employees (in FTEs), the percentage shares, and
the growth rates by year and group. \0", \1" and \2" label the groups of non-aected,
aected, and strongly aected plants, respectively. The denitions of the variables
are provided in Table A.4 in the Appendix.
The casual comparison of pre- and post-liberalization plant characteristics suggests
that the liberalization of trade had a slightly negative (if any) eect on plant growth.
Across all groups of plants, the growth rates rst declined after liberalization, and then
only partially recovered (except for the group of strongly aected rms). However, Ta-
bles 2 and 3 also highlight considerable dierences across the groups of plants. When
estimating the eect of the Bilateral Agreements I on plant growth based on the DiD and
the matching approach, we will account for these dierences.
As many of the characteristics shown in Table 2 are correlated, Table 4 provides the
corresponding multivariate analysis based on a probit model comparing the unaected
group to the dierent aected groups.24 It shows the key correlates of a plant's prob-
ability of being aected by the Bilateral Agreements I. Inspection of Table 4 indicates
that manufacturing and importing plants with foreign owners have a particularly high
probability of being (strongly) aected. Other plant characteristics are also relevant, but
they appear to be less important.
24Later on, it will turn out that this estimation forms one of the `propensity scores' we are using when
estimating the eects corrected for the dierences between the various plant groups (see Section 4.3).
12Table 4: Binary Probit Estimates (Matching)
Groups
Variable 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2)
Headquarter 0.0503*** 0.0003 0.0476***
Single-Plant Firm 0.0295*** 0.0085*** 0.0332***
Manufacturer 0.3073*** 0.2538*** 0.3837***
Exporter 0.0178*** 0.0262*** 0.0336***
Exporter-missing 0.0101** -0.0009 0.0091*
Importer 0.1881*** 0.0300*** 0.1894***
Importer-missing -0.0117** 0.0014 -0.0109**
Foreign Ownership/Assets (Ref.: \Not Owned" and \Not Owner")
Owns 0.0097* 0.0083*** 0.0127***
Owns-missing -0.0009 0.0024 0.0001
Owned 0.1281*** 0.0152*** 0.1246***
Owned-missing 0.0055 0.0004 0.0051
Municipality (Reference: Center)
Suburban 0.0691*** 0.0075*** 0.0685***
High-Income 0.0448*** 0.0011 0.0416***
Periurban 0.0721*** 0.0070*** 0.0701***
Touristic -0.0147*** -0.0124*** -0.0222***
Industrial Tertiary 0.0493*** 0.0029** 0.0462***
Rural Commuter 0.0971*** 0.0091*** 0.0925***
Renewal Economic Region 0.0093*** 0.0027*** 0.0116***
Region (Reference: Z urich)
Geneva Lake -0.0051** -0.0048*** -0.0073***
Espace Midland -0.0093*** 0.0006 -0.0081***
North-West -0.0168*** -0.0017 -0.0170***
East -0.0021 0.0014 -0.0024
Central 0.0093*** -0.0004 0.0073**
Tessin 0.0014 -0.0069*** -0.0026
Size (Non-linear) YES YES YES
Observations: 232.334 196.274 240.936
Notes: Coecients show the average marginal eects and for the dummy
variables discrete changes in the quantities of interest. , , and  es-
timates are signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. \0",
\1" and \2" label the groups of non-aected, aected, and strongly aected
plants, respectively. The denitions of the variables and the complete results
are presented in Tables A.4, A.5, and A.6, respectively, in the Appendix.
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4.1 Empirical Research Design
It is useful to illustrate our approach using the potential-outcome notation which is now
standard in the policy evaluation literature (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Specically,
let D denote the binary indicator of trade liberalization (via the Bilateral Agreements I)
with d 2 f0;1g.25 We are interested in estimating the mean eect of trade liberalization
(i.e., switching D from zero to one) on plant size in period t. To do so, let the outcome
variable Y d
t denote the `potential' plant size that would be realized for some value d in
period t (which may be unobservable). Yt denotes the observed plant size in period t.
We want to answer the policy question whether the plants (strongly) aected by
the Bilateral Agreements I beneted from the liberalization of trade. That is, we are






t jD = 1). (1)
It is important to note that, if t denotes a period prior to trade liberalization (e.g., the
year 2001), ATETt measures the anticipation eect of liberalization . If t denotes a period
after trade liberalization (e.g., 2005 or 2008), ATETt measures the medium to longer-run
eect of trade liberalization.
The potential-outcome notation claries the estimation problem at hand and points
to the key issue of causal inference: How can we infer what would have happened (in
period t) to the plants aected by the trade liberalization, if the trade liberalization had
not taken place? Unfortunately, this `counterfactual outcome' is never observed. We
therefore have to use credible assumptions to impute this outcome.
Our identication strategy exploits the two key advantages of our data base. First,
we have data on a very large number of plants|the universe of Swiss plants. This feature
allows us to avoid the behavioral restrictions implied (but seldom discussed) by tightly
specied parametric models of the linear or non-linear regression type. Second, we have
panel data over 13 years with measurements in ve dierent periods (1995, 1998, 2001,
2005, and 2008). Thus, we can use the pre-liberalization performance of the plants to
nd out what would have happened in the absence of trade liberalization.
The key assumption necessary for any partial-equilibrium analysis is that interactions
between plants are not relevant for the eect of trade liberalization on plant growth
(SUTVA, Rubin (1977)). This assumption implies that one of the potential outcomes Y d
t
25Capital letters denote random variables, and small letters denote realizations of random variables.
14is observable for each plant at time t, i.e., Yt = dY 1
t + (1   d)Y 0
t , with d 2 f0;1g.26
In addition, we assume that the observable covariates X with value x are exogenous
(EXOG) in the sense of not being in
uenced by the liberalization of trade. Similarly,
we assume that the pre-liberalization outcomes for 1995 and 1998 were not aected by
the liberalization of trade in 2002 (NEPT). We do allow, though, for the possibility that
plants anticipated the change in 2001 and already reacted to it.
Finally, since our empirical strategy relies on the use of non-aected plants to impute
what would have happened to aected plants in the absence of trade liberalization (for
all values of X for which we observe aected or strongly aected plants), we also need to
observe plants which are not aected by the liberalization of trade. This assumption is
called the common support condition (COSU).
If these assumptions are satised, there are two major approaches towards exploiting
the panel dimension for non- or semi-parametric identication, namely the matching
approach (see the excellent survey by Imbens (2004)) and the dierences-in-dierences
(DiD) approach (see Lechner (2010) for a recent survey).
With the matching approach, we can use the pre-liberalization outcomes as additional
control variables. That is, we infer what would have happened to the plants aected by
the trade liberalization by using the weighted mean of the outcomes of the non-aected
plants. The weights are chosen such that the reweighted distribution of characteristics
of the non-aected plants is identical to that observed for the aected plants, with the
characteristics including functions of the 1995 and 1998 outcomes. The estimates based
on this approach have a causal interpretation if the so-called conditional independence
assumption (CIA) holds, that is, if we are able to control for all factors that jointly
in
uence the outcomes and the fact that a plant is aected.27 This assumption (in
addition to those already mentioned) implies
E(Y
0
t jX = x;Y98 = y98;Y95 = y95;D = 1)
= E(Y
0
t jX = x;Y98 = y98;Y95 = y95;D = 0)
= E(YtjX = x;Y98 = y98;Y95 = y95;D = 0).
Since SUTVA also implies E(Y 1
t jD = 1) = E(YtjD = 1), the ATETt is identied in
all periods t because, as can be seen by applying the law of iterated expectations to the
26See Lechner (2010) for a formal denition of this and the following identifying assumptions.
27We discuss below whether we think this assumption is credible in our setting.
15second term in the ATETt in (1),
E(Y
0
t jD = 1)
= E[E(Y
0
t jX = x;Y98 = y98;Y95 = y95;D = 1)jD = 1]
= E[E(YtjX = x;Y98 = y98;Y95 = y95;D = 0)jD = 1]:
The alternative is to adopt a DiD approach and use the pre-liberalization outcomes
in a dierencing framework, where the key assumption is that the group of non-aected
plants is facing the same time trend as the group of (strongly) aected plants would face
in the absence of trade liberalization, given specic values of the covariates. This is called










98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 0); 8t 2 f2001;2005;2008g.
Note, in particular, that the outcomes of the year 1998 do not appear as conditioning
variables, because otherwise the matching and the DiD approach would be identical.




98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = d)
= E(Y98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = d); 8d; ~ d 2 f0;1g:
This assumption requires that we have access to all exogenous variables which could lead
to a dierential trend for the potential outcome of the non-aected and the (strongly)
aected plants in the absence of trade liberalization. We will discuss in Section 4.2 below
whether this is plausible in our context.
It is easy to show that the common trend assumption together with the assumptions




t jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 1)
= E(Y
0
t jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 0)   E(Y
0
98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 0)
+E(Y
0
98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 1)
= E(YtjX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 0)   E(Y98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 0)
+E(Y98jX = x;Y95 = y95;D = 1).
16Applying the law of iterated expectations in the same way as for matching gives the
expression for the ATETt in terms of observable quantities and thus proves identication.
Comparing the assumptions of the matching and the DiD approach, it becomes clear
that the common-trend assumption is in fact a CIA applied to a dierence of the out-
come variables over time. The advantage of this transformation is that any unobservable
variable which aects the counterfactual outcome in all periods in the same way and is
additively separable (e.g., an individual xed eect in a xed-eects panel regression), is
no threat to validity because it is dierenced out. This 
exibility comes at the cost of
a functional-form dependence: A common-trend assumption which is valid for the level
of the outcome variable (and thus removes the xed eect) is not necessarily valid for a
monotone but nonlinear transformation (see Lechner (2010), for example). In this sense,
identication is functional-form dependent.
The matching approach, on the other hand, uses the outcome variable of 1998 to
make the plants comparable on that dimension as well, rather than to take a dierence.
Although this comparison does not formally remove a xed eect (even if it is additively
separable), it holds for all transformations of the outcome variable. Furthermore, one
may argue that conditioning on the outcome 1998 implicitly conditions on the impact of
the xed eect on the future outcome and thus removes (most of) that problem as well.28
4.2 Plausibility of Assumptions
The identication of the causal eect of trade liberalization on plant growth crucially
relies on the identifying assumptions. We consider the plausibility of each of them in
turn.
First, consider the SUTVA assumption, which requires that one of the potential out-
comes Y d
t is observable for each plant at time t. In our setting, the outcome variable Yt is
plant size in year t, measured by the log of the number of employees in FTEs plus one.29
In our setting, SUTVA is violated if the liberalization of trade was important enough to
aect the outcome for all (i.e., even the non-aected) plants. Our plant classication sug-
gests that the Bilateral Agreements I did not aect all plants. Recall that the impact of
agreement (B) on the free movements of persons, which might have aected all industries,
was severely limited by so-called `accompanying measures' (\
ankierende Massnahmen"),
which prevented major changes in the labor markets of non-aected industries. A crucial
element of these measures are quotas which limited the in
ow of workers from EU-15
countries until May 31, 2007, and continue to be in place for other EU countries. Given
28See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for further discussion.
29We add one to the number of employees in FTEs to deal with inactive plants (where the the number
of FTEs is zero by denition).
17the existence of these quotas and other eorts against the undercutting of wages, we are
condent that the remaining interactions between non-aected and other plants (if any)
in our sample are negligible.
Next, consider the assumptions that both the covariates X (EXOG) and the outcomes
for the years 1995 and 1998 (NEPT) are exogenous. We feel pretty safe in making
these assumptions, since the negotiations between the EU (or the EC, respectively) and
Switzerland were still well under way in 1998, and the Swiss electorate approved the
Bilateral Agreements I only in May 2000 (see Section 2.1). It seems quite likely, though,
that variables measured in 2001 were aected by the anticipated liberalization of trade.
We therefore allow for an anticipation eect in the period from 1998 to 2001.
The common-support assumption (COSU), which requires that there is valid com-
parison group of non-treated plants for the characteristics x, is not problematic, because
there is a very large control group of more than 185,000 plants with considerable varia-
tion of x. It is worth noting that this assumption is testable, and our tests suggest no
problems.
Proceeding under the notion that these four basic assumptions are satised, we now
discuss the dierent additional assumptions needed for the matching and the DiD ap-
proach, respectively. Recall that the matching approach additionally imposes the con-
ditional independence assumption (CIA), which requires the control of all factors that
jointly determine the outcomes and whether a plant is aected. We are convinced that,
thanks to the large set of covariates X available at the plant level (including lagged out-
comes from 1995 and 1998), we eectively control for the key factors discussed in the
relevant literature. For instance, in addition to a plant's size, which is often viewed as
a measure of productivity in the new trade literature, we are able to control for its ex-
port and import activity, whether it owns foreign assets or is owned by foreign rms, its
geographic location, etc.30 Nevertheless, we may imperfectly control for some relevant
unobservable factors, such as a plant's pre-liberalization integration into European mar-
kets. With this in mind, one may argue that the common trend assumption (from 1998
onwards) necessary for the DiD approach is more plausibly satised, because by including
the growth rate from 1995 to 1998 in the set of control variables, we have already enforced
a common trend from 1995 to 1998 by construction.
On balance, it seems dicult to denitely determine which of the two non-nested
approaches is more suitable for identifying the causal eect of trade liberalization on
plant growth. We will therefore provide the results of both approaches in Section 5
below.
30See Table A.4 in the Appendix for a list of the available plant characteristics.
184.3 Estimation
Having established identication, the next issue is how to perform estimation. The sim-
plest approach, which is still fairly common in some elds, is to specify a parametric
model for the relation of the outcome variable with the policy variable and the condition-
ing variables. For the log of plant size, a linear regression would be a natural choice. For
the DiD estimation, one would choose a specication with X and the 1995-1998 growth
rate, a time trend, a group indicator, and the interaction of time and group capturing
the eect of the liberalization. For the matching estimation, the outcome would be re-
gressed on X and the log of plant size in 1995 and 1998. However, the disadvantage
of these simple approaches is that they lead to inconsistent results if these regressions
are misspecied. The latter is the case, for instance, if the eect of the liberalization
is heterogeneous across plants, and this heterogeneity relates to the characteristics X or
plant size in 1995 or 1998.
The alternative is to use semi-parametric matching-type procedures involving the
propensity score. The idea is to specify the relation between the membership in a partic-
ular group (non-aected, aected, or strongly aected) and the respective control vari-
ables using a parametric model, but leaving the relation of the outcome to the control
variables free. This approach is common in the program evaluation literature and now
spreading to many other elds. It is justied by the additional robustness of not having
to specify the relation of the outcomes to the policy variable and the conditioning vari-
ables. Clearly, such semi-parametric approaches require large data sets, because giving
up functional-form assumptions leads to additional uncertainty in estimation. Yet, the
requirement of a large data set is not a problem in our case.
The key insight for deriving practical estimators is that creating `comparable obser-
vations' with respect to the conditioning variables is not necessary, provided that there is
comparability with respect to a particular function of those variables called the propensity
score
p(X)  Pr(D = 1jX) = E(DjX): (2)
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) used this property to develop the propensity-score match-
ing estimators. Lechner (2010), among others, shows that the same idea can be used to
develop semi-parametric DiD estimators based on propensity-score matching.
In this paper, we estimate the propensity score with a probit model (see Table 4 in
Section 3.4).31 Then, for the matching estimates, we use a bias-adjusted radius matching
procedure as in Lechner et al. (forthcoming), which has superior small-sample properties
(Huber et al., 2010). For the DiD matching, an inverse probability estimator is used
31The complete results are presented in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix.
19(Huber et al., 2010; Lechner, 2010).
Due to the particular structure of the plant data, observations for plants which belong
to the same company are probably correlated. We approach this problem by devising a
bootstrap procedure that independently draws rms (with all their plants in all periods)
and basing the inference on the resulting bootstrap distribution of the estimates.
5 Results
Table 5 reports the results from estimating the ATETt with the DiD and the matching
methodology. The columns indicate the relevant comparison of plant groups. Specically,
we focus on non-aected vs. aected plants (0 ! 1), non-aected vs. strongly aected
plants (0 ! 2), and non-aected vs. the pool of aected and strongly aected plants
(0 ! (1;2)). The rows indicate the years for which the comparison is made (2001, 2005,
and 2008, respectively).32 The table entries report the estimated extra growth rates
caused by trade liberalization measured in percentage changes.
Table 5: Estimates of the ATET
Dierence-in-Dierences Matching
Year 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2) 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2)
2001 -2.00*** -0.60 -1.90*** -0.90 -0.10 -1.30
(0.50) (1.30) (0.60) (1.10) (3.90) (1.30)
2005 1.30* 1.30 1.20* 1.80* 2.20 1.60
(0.70) (1.90) (0.80) (1.10) (3.70) (1.30)
2008 1.30* 4.00** 1.60** 1.80* 5.30 2.20*
(0.80) (2.00) (0.90) (1.10) (3.70) (1.30)
Notes: Outcome variable is log(size+1) in the respective year, with size measured by the number of
employees in FTEs. Results are shown in percentage points, which follow from the dierences in the
average outcomes across groups. Plants which exit in 2005 or 2008 are coded to have size zero.
, , and  estimates are signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors and inference has been obtained by clustered
bootstrap at the rm level using the bootstrap distribution of the eects based on 499 replications.
\0", \1" and \2" label the groups of non-aected, aected, and strongly aected plants, respectively.
Let us rst consider the pre-liberalization year 2001. The DiD estimates suggest that
the aected plants (0 ! 1) experienced a signicant reduction in growth by 2 percent
in anticipation of the trade liberalization (from 1998 to 2001). The pool of aected and
32Recall that our identifying assumptions require the outcomes for 1995 and 1998 to be unaected by
the liberalization of trade.
20strongly aected plants (0 ! (1;2)) also experienced a signicant reduction in growth
by 1.9 percent, whereas the group of strongly aected plants (0 ! 2) alone did not
suer from a signicant reduction in growth. The matching estimates are less precise
than the DiD estimates, but they suggest a reduction in growth of a similar order of
magnitude. These ndings are consistent with the notion that, in anticipation of the
trade liberalization, the aected plants increased their productivity with the intention of
becoming (larger) exporters (L opez, 2005).33
Next, consider the post-liberalization years 2005 and 2008. Both the DiD and the
matching estimates suggest that the liberalization of trade increased the growth of the
aected plants by 1-2 percent during the rst six years after liberalization. The extra
growth of the strongly aected plants during the same time is estimated to be around 4-5
percent. That is, the negative anticipation eect of trade liberalization on plant growth
was transitory in nature and turned into a positive eect by 2005.
Summing up, our results suggest that, after a transitory anticipation phase in which
plant growth was reduced by up to 2 percent, the Bilateral Agreements I increased the
growth of aected plants by 1-2 percent during the rst six years after liberalization. The
growth of strongly aected plants, in turn, increased by 4-5 percent.
6 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a policy evaluation approach towards estimating the eect of
trade liberalization on growth. This approach is designed to avoid the well-known econo-
metric diculties plaguing previous work in this eld. In particular, it allows us to
identify the direction of causation from trade liberalization on growth.
Viewing a bundle of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and the EU (Bilateral
Agreements I) enacted in June 2002 as a plausibly exogenous instance of trade liberal-
ization, we have used data on the universe of Swiss plants from 1995 to 2008 to estimate
the eect of trade liberalization on plant growth. Employing both a semi-parametric DiD
and a matching approach, we have found the following results:
First, there is evidence for a negative anticipation eect. According to our estimates,
the average growth of the aected plants was reduced by up to 2 percent in anticipation
of the trade liberalization. This nding is consistent with the notion that rms improve
their productivity in anticipation of a market opening.
Second, the negative anticipation eect was turned into a positive eect after liberal-
33Note, though, that we do not observe productivity at the plant level, so that the anticipation eect
needs to be interpreted carefully. Implicitly, this view of the anticipation eect presumes that (non-
observable) outputs were non-decreasing during the anticipation phase.
21ization, increasing the average growth of the aected plants by about 1-2 percent during
the rst six years after enactment. That is, the trade liberalization caused a signicant
and persistent extra growth of the aected plants.
Our results support the view that trade liberalization has a relevant eect on economic
growth. It should be clear, though, that the eect is likely to vary across dierent
instances of trade liberalization and industries aected. It would therefore be interesting
to compare our results to similar policy evaluation studies of trade liberalization. A
collection of such studies is likely to provide persuasive empirical evidence on the impact
of trade liberalization on economic growth.
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24Table A.1: Industry Classication into Groups
Agreement Group Comment(s)
A B C D E F G
Mining of Coal and Minerals, Extraction of Oil and Peat
10 Mining of Coal and Extraction of Peat 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 B1
11 Extraction of Crude Oil and Gas 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 B1
12 Mining of Uranium and Thorium Ores 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 B1
Mining of Iron Ores and Quarrying
13 Mining of Iron Ores 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 B1
14 Other Mining and Quarrying 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9 B1
Manufacturing of Food
15 Food and Beverage 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 A2, B1,C1,C2
16 Tobacco Products 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 A2, B1,C1,C2
Manufacturing of Textiles and Textile Products
17 Textiles 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,A2,B1,X17
18 Apparel 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,A2,B1
Leather and Leather Products
19 Leather Products 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,A2,B1
Manufacturing of Wood and Wood Products
20 Wood, Cork, ... 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,A2,B1
Manufacturing of Pulp, Paper and Paper Products
21 Paper 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A2,B1
22 Publishing, Printing 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 A2,B1
Manufacturing of Koke and Rened Petroleum
23 Koke, Rened Petroleum 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Manufacturing of Chemicals and Chemical Products
24 Chemicals 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 A1,B1,C2
Manufacturing of Syntheticals and Synthetical Products
25 Syntheticals 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,B1
Manufacture of Non-Metalic Mineral Products
26 Glass, Ceramic, etc. 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 A2,B1,X26
Production, Manufacturing of Metal and Metal Products
27 Production of Metal 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 A2,B1,X26
28 Metal Products 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 A2,B1,X26
Manufacturing Systems Engeneering
29 Machinery, Equipment 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,A2,D1
Manufacturing of Business Machines
30 Business Machines 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,A2,B1,D1
31 Electric Machinery 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,A2,B1,D1
32 Radio, TV, Communication Apparatus 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 A1,A2,B1
33 Med. Apparatus, Precision Instruments 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,A2,B1
Vehicle Manufacturing
34 Automobiles and Parts of Cars 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,B1,D1
35 Other Vehicles 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 A1,B1,D1
25Table A.1: Industry Classication into Groups (continued)
Agreement Group Comment(s)
A B C D E F G
Manufacturing of Furniture, Jewellery, Musical Instruments
36 Furniture, Jewellery, etc. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,B1
37 Recyling 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply
40 Energy Supply 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 B1,D2
41 Water Supply 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 B1,D2
Construction Industry
45 Construction 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 B1,D2
Retail and Wholesale Trade, Repair of Automobiles
50 Trade of parts and complete Vehicles 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 A1,B1
Repair and Maintenance
51 Wholesale and Commission Trade 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 B1,X51
52 Retail Trade 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 B1,C1,X52
Lodging and Restaurants
55 Lodging and Restaurants 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Transportation and Communication
60 Land Transportation and Pipelines 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 B1,E1
61 Water Transportation 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
62 Air Transportation 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 B1,F1
63 Auxiliary Transport Activities 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 B1,E1,F1
64 Post and Telecommunications 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Credit Institutions and Insurances
65 Commercial and Central Banks, Fonds 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
66 Insurance Companies 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
67 Banking Business Activities 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Real Estate and Housing, Renting of Good and Chattels
70 Real Estate and Housing 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
71 Renting of Goods and Chattels 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
72 Data Processing and Data Bases 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 B1,D1
73 Research and Development 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 B1,G
74 Other Business Activity 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Public Administration, Social Insurance
75 Public Administration, Social Insurance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Education
80 Education 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Health Care, Welfare
85 Health Care, Welfare 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Other Public or Private Services
90 Sewage and Waste Treatment 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 B1,D1
91 Lobby, Religious Organizations 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
92 Culture and Sports Activities 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
93 Other Services 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Private Households Goods and Services
95 Households with Employees 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
96 Manufacturing for own use 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
97 Services for own use 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 B1
Notes: \0", \1", \2" and \9" label the groups of non-aected, aected, strongly aected and excluded
plants, respectively. You can nd the \comments" below this table.
26Comments:
(A1) The MRA explicitly covers the following industries: (1) Machinery; (2) Personal
protective equipment; (3) Toys; (4) Medical devices; (5) Gas appliances and boilers;
(6) Pressure vessels; (7) Telecommunications terminal equipment; (8) Equipment
and protective systems intended for use in potentially explosive atmospheres; (9)
Electrical equipment and electromagnetic compatibility; (10) Construction plants
and equipment; (11) Measuring instruments and prepackages; (12) Motor vehicles;
(13) Agricultural and forestry tractors; (14) Good laboratory practice (GLP); (15)
Medical products GMP Inspection and Batch Certication.
(A2) The MRA does not cover all \packing" from either country. Since the MRA allows
to ask for conformity in a single inspection authority, it substantially eases the proof
of conformity.
(B1) The agreement on the free movement of persons ensures equal treatment of Swiss
and EU citizens in taking up residence and work. However, the in
ow of workers
from EU-15 countries continued to be limited by quotas until May 31, 2007, and it
is still limited for other EU countries. It is thus reasonable to assume that, at least
until summer 2007, this agreement had virtually no impact on Swiss industries.
(C1) The agreement on agricultural products liberalizes the cheese market (free trade
since June 2007) and simplies trade in other agricultural products. The treaty
should be expected to in
uence all industries dealing with agricultural products.
(C2) The agreement on agricultural products removes technical trade barriers in the fol-
lowing elds: (1) Crop protection; (2) Animal feed; (3) Viniculture; (4) Spirits and

avored drinks containing wine; (5) Organic products and foodstu; (6) Recogni-
tion of conformity checks for fruit and vegetables subject to marketing standards;
(7) Veterinary and breeding measures applicable to trade in living animals and
animal products.
(D1) The rst chapter of the agreement on public procurement extends the WTO rules
and subjects public authorities and bodies at the district and municipality level to
compulsory tendering.
(D2) The second chapter of the agreement on public procurement subjects licensed rms
(e.g., telecommunications and railway operators) to compulsory tendering.
(E1) The agreement on ground transportation increases the maximum weight limit for
heavy trucks from 28 to 40 tonnes and prescribes the introduction of a Pigouvian
27tax on heavy vehicles, which provides incentives for moving transalpine freight from
road to rail.
(F1) The agreement on civil aviation stipulates reciprocal access to aviation markets
(including landing rights).
(G) The agreement on scientic and technological cooperation regulates the participa-
tion of Swiss research institutions and individual in EU programs.
(X17) Not aected by agreement D (no evidence for tendering).
(X26) Aected by agreement D (public tendering is observed).
(X51) Aected by agreement A (cf. A1 and A2 above).
(X52) Aected by agreement C, because agricultural products are imported more easily
(cf. C1 above).
Table A.2: Sample Size
Year
1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Complete Data Base 372,782 379,330 385,074 375,167 389,165
(100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Eliminated Plants
Non-Private 37,892 35,361 34,073 33,050 32,747
(10.16) (9.32) (8.85) (8.81) (8.41)
Mining Industries etc. 34,672 34,560 36,283 35,462 37,156
(9.30) (9.11) (9.42) (9.45) (9.55)
Not Active in 1995 and 1998 59,282 68,473 119,107 147,172 175,998
(15.90) (18.05) (30.93) (39.23) (45.22)
Final Sample 240,936 240,936 195,611 159,483 143,264
(64.63) (63.52) (50.80) (42.51) (36.81)
Notes: Shown is the number and share of plants by year. The nal sample consists of
240,936 plants. In the nal sample all plants observed in 2001 and later are already
observed in 1995 and 1998. Estimation is based on 240,936 plants with employment
levels for plants which were closed after 1998 set to zero.
28Table A.3: Number of Plants by Group, Size, and Year
Year
Group Size 1995 1998 2001 2005 2008
Micro (0-9) 160,107 160,998 127,559 101,476 88,715
(100.00) (100.56) (79.67) (63.38) (55.41)
Small (9-49) 24,161 23,424 21,363 19,051 18,862
not (100.00) (96.95) (88.42) (78.85) (78.07)
aected Medium (49-249) 3139 2,991 2,911 2,649 2,755
(\0") (100.00) (95.29) (92.74) (84.39) (87.77)
Large (249+) 265 259 277 230 253
(100.00) (97.74) (104.53) (86.79) (95.47)
Total (group \0") 187,672 187,672 152,110 123,406 110,585
(100.00) (100.00) (81.05) (65.76) (58.92)
Micro (0-9) 36,317 36,477 28,975 23,248 20,457
(100.00) (100.44) (79.78) (64.01) (56.33)
Small (9-49) 6,850 6,726 5,982 5,545 5,412
aected (100.00) (98.19) (87.33) (80.95) (79.01)
(\1") Medium (49-249) 1,350 1,316 1,214 1,079 1,096
(100.00) (97.48) (89.93) (79.93) (81.19)
Large (249+) 145 143 154 136 148
(100.00) (98.62) (106.21) (93.79) (102.07)
Total (group \1") 44,662 44,662 36,325 30,008 27,113
(100.00) (100.00) (81.33) (67.19) (60.71)
Micro (0-9) 5,960 5,994 4,748 3,933 3,433
(100.00) (100.57) (79.66) (65.99) (57.60)
Small (9-49) 1,778 1,748 1,585 1,413 1,366
strongly (100.00) (98.31) (89.15) (79.47) (76.83)
aected Medium (49-249) 691 688 686 580 602
(\2") (100.00) (99.57) (99.28) (83.94) (87.12)
Large (249+) 173 172 157 143 165
(100.00) (99.42) (90.75) (82.66) (95.38)
Total (group \2") 8,602 8,602 7,176 6,069 5,566
(100.00) (100.00) (83.42) (70.55) (64.71)
Total (all groups) 240,936 240,936 195,611 159,483 143,264
(100.00) (100.00) (81.19) (66.19) (59.46)
Notes: The number in brackets shows the percentage relative to the reference year 1995.
The classication of plants into groups is based on Table A.1.
29Table A.4: Denitions of the Variables
Variable Description
Headquarter Plant is a headquarter of a Multi-Plant Company.
Single-Plant Firm Plant is a Single-Plant Company.
Companion Plant is a companion plant of a Multi-Plant Company.
Manufacturer Plant is in the manufacturing sector.
Exporter Plant belongs to a rm which exports to foreign markets.
Exporter-missing Survey question is not asked (1998, 2001 and 2008) or not answered.
Importer Plant belongs to a rm which imports from abroad.
Importer-missing Survey question is not asked (1998, 2001 and 2008) or not answered.
Renewal Economic Region Region is eligible for public funds supporting regional development.
Size Plant's employment is measured in FTEs.
Foreign Ownership/Assets
Owns Plant belongs to a rm which (partly) owns foreign assets.
Owns-missing Survey question is not asked (1998 and 2008) or not answered.
Owned Plant belongs to a rm which is (partly) owned by foreign capital.
Owned-missing Survey question is not asked (1998 and 2008) or not answered.
Municipality
Center Central municipality of a large agglomeration in a metropolitan region.
Suburban Suburban or job-rich (non-central) municipality in a metropolitan region.
High-Income Real income per resident exceeds some specic threshold in the region.
Periurban Municipality in an agglomeration (neither suburban nor high-income).
Touristic Municipality featuring a high number of touristic overnight stays.
Industrial Tertiary Municipality with a high production of industrial goods and services.
Rural Commuter Municipality located outside an agglomeration with a high share of commuters.
Rural Mixed Municipality with a relatively high share of agrarian production.
Rural Municipality Municipality with high share of agrarian production.
Geographic Region Canton
Z urich Z urich
Geneva Lake Geneva, Vaud, Valais
Espace Midland Bern, Fribourg, Jura, Neuch^ atel, Solothurn
North-West Aargau, Basel-Country, Basel-City
East Appenzell Inner-Rhodes, Appenzell Outer-Rhodes, Glarus, Graub unden,
St. Gallen, Schahausen, Thurgau
Central Lucerne, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Schwyz, Uri, Zug
Tessin Ticino
Notes: Municipalities and geographic regions are classied by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oce and
documented in Schuler et al. (2005).
30Table A.5: Binary Probit Estimates (Matching)
Coecients Average Marginal Eects
Variable 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2) 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2)
Headquarter 0.2325*** 0.0057 0.2102*** 0.0503*** 0.0003 0.0476***
Single-Plant Firm 0.1311*** 0.1579*** 0.1433*** 0.0295*** 0.0085*** 0.0332***
Manufacturer 0.9930*** 1.7734*** 1.1850*** 0.3073*** 0.2538*** 0.3837***
Exporter 0.0744*** 0.3900*** 0.1342*** 0.0178*** 0.0262*** 0.0336***
Exporter-missing 0.0428** -0.0160 0.0375* 0.0101** -0.0009 0.0091*
Importer 0.6846*** 0.4520*** 0.6785*** 0.1881*** 0.0300*** 0.1894***
Importer-missing -0.0510** 0.0243 -0.0459** -0.0117** 0.0014 -0.0109**
Foreign Ownership/Assets (Reference: \Not Owned" and \Not Owner", respectively)
Owns 0.0409* 0.1347*** 0.0521*** 0.0097* 0.0083*** 0.0127***
Owns-missing -0.0038 0.0404 0.0004 -0.0009 0.0024 0.0001
Owned 0.4685*** 0.2350*** 0.4527*** 0.1281*** 0.0152*** 0.1246***
Owned-missing 0.0235 0.0073 0.0210 0.0055 0.0004 0.0051
Municipality (Reference: Center)
Suburban 0.2809*** 0.1268*** 0.2723*** 0.0691*** 0.0075*** 0.0685***
High-Income 0.1804*** 0.0186 0.1647*** 0.0448*** 0.0011 0.0416***
Periurban 0.2830*** 0.1156*** 0.2708*** 0.0721*** 0.0070*** 0.0701***
Touristic -0.0646*** -0.2452*** -0.0951*** -0.0147*** -0.0124*** -0.0222***
Industrial Tertiary 0.1990*** 0.0498** 0.1829*** 0.0493*** 0.0029** 0.0462***
Rural Commuter 0.3688*** 0.1471*** 0.3478*** 0.0971*** 0.0091*** 0.0925***
Rural Mixed 0.4021*** 0.0871*** 0.3647*** 0.1067*** 0.0052*** 0.0973***
Rural Municipality 0.4207*** -0.0005 0.3661*** 0.1136*** 0.0000 0.0985***
Renewal Region 0.0396*** 0.0467*** 0.0480*** 0.0093*** 0.0027*** 0.0116***
Region (Reference: Z urich)
Geneva Lake -0.0219* -0.0873*** -0.0308*** -0.0051** -0.0048*** -0.0073***
Espace Midland -0.0402*** 0.0103 -0.0342*** -0.0093*** 0.0006 -0.0081***
North-West -0.0738*** -0.0298 -0.0720*** -0.0168*** -0.0017 -0.0170***
East -0.0092 0.0240 -0.0102 -0.0021 0.0014 -0.0024
Central 0.0395*** -0.0076 0.0301** 0.0093*** -0.0004 0.0073**
Tessin 0.0058 -0.1280*** -0.0108 0.0014 -0.0069*** -0.0026
Size (Non-linear) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant -1.8170*** -2.7948*** -1.7785*** | | |
Observations: 232.334 196.274 240.936 232.334 196.274 240.936
Notes: The dependent variable is binary; it is 0 for non-treated plants and 1 for the treated plants in
groups \1" or \2", respectively. , , and  estimates are signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. The sizes of rms and plants are measured in full time employment units and the coecients
are left out here for the purpose of clarity.
31Table A.6: Binary Probit Estimates (Dierence-in-Dierences)
Coecients Average Marginal Eects
Variable 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2) 0 ! 1 0 ! 2 0 ! (1;2)
Growth (1995/1998) -0.0007 -0.0072 -0.0011 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003
Headquarter 0.3841*** 0.1306*** 0.3701*** 0.0796*** 0.0071*** 0.0805***
Single-Plant Firm 0.1271*** 0.1299*** 0.1319*** 0.0288*** 0.0071*** 0.0308***
Manufacturer 0.9975*** 1.7783*** 1.1923*** 0.3109*** 0.2570*** 0.3888***
Exporter 0.0883*** 0.3955*** 0.1498*** 0.0213*** 0.0268*** 0.0379***
Exporter-missing 0.0494** -0.0077 0.0441** 0.0118** -0.0004 0.0108**
Importer 0.6730*** 0.4421*** 0.6676*** 0.1849*** 0.0293*** 0.1865***
Importer-missing -0.0605*** 0.0222 -0.0547*** -0.0139*** 0.0013 -0.0130***
Foreign Ownership/Assets (Reference: \Not Owned" and \Not Owner", respectively)
Owns -0.0991*** 0.1109*** -0.0754*** -0.0224*** 0.0067*** -0.0177***
Owns-missing -0.0092 0.0429 -0.0051 -0.0021 0.0025 -0.0012
Owned 0.4458*** 0.1941*** 0.4278*** 0.1217*** 0.0123*** 0.1176***
Owned-missing 0.0270 0.0078 0.0245 0.0064 0.0004 0.0059
Municipality (Reference: Center)
Suburban 0.2784*** 0.1254*** 0.2705*** 0.0688*** 0.0074*** 0.0684***
High-Income 0.1750*** 0.0191 0.1593*** 0.0436*** 0.0011 0.0404***
Periurban 0.2802*** 0.1158*** 0.2686*** 0.0718*** 0.0070*** 0.0699***
Touristic -0.0651*** -0.2513*** -0.0963*** -0.0149*** -0.0127*** -0.0225***
Industrial Tertiary 0.1932*** 0.0459* 0.1773*** 0.0480*** 0.0027* 0.0449***
Rural Commuter 0.3663*** 0.1454*** 0.3454*** 0.0969*** 0.0090*** 0.0923***
Rural Mixed 0.3985*** 0.0835*** 0.3612*** 0.1063*** 0.0050** 0.0968***
Rural Municipality 0.4179*** 0.0020 0.3633*** 0.1134*** 0.0001 0.0983***
Renewal Region 0.0392*** 0.0445*** 0.0472*** 0.0092*** 0.0026*** 0.0115***
Region (Reference: Z urich)
Geneva Lake -0.0156 -0.0824*** -0.0245** -0.0037 -0.0046*** -0.0059**
Espace Midland -0.0413*** 0.0061 -0.0355*** -0.0096*** 0.0004 -0.0085***
North-West -0.0732*** -0.0309 -0.0713*** -0.0168*** -0.0018 -0.0169***
East -0.0097 0.0182 -0.0111 -0.0023 0.0011 -0.0027
Central 0.0418*** -0.0122 0.0319*** 0.0099*** -0.0007 0.0078**
Tessin 0.0105 -0.1283*** -0.0064 0.0025 -0.0069*** -0.0015
Constant -1.8573*** -2.8151*** -1.8170*** | | |
Observations: 232.334 196.274 240.936 232.334 196.274 240.936
Notes: The dependent variable is binary; it is 0 for non-treated plants and 1 for the treated plants in
groups \1" or \2", respectively. , , and  estimates are signicant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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